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Citizenship in Europe: The Main Stages 
of Development of the Idea and Institution
Abstract
This paper identifi es and synthetically demonstrates the most important 
steps and changes in the evolution of the idea and institution of citizen-
ship in Europe over more than two thousand years. Citizenship is one of 
the essential categories defi ning human status. From a historical perspec-
tive, the idea of citizenship in Europe is in a state of constant evolution. 
Therefore, the essence of the institution of citizenship and its acquisition 
criteria are continually being transformed. Today’s comprehension of citi-
zenship is different from understanding citizenship in Europe in earlier 
epochs of history. In some of them, the concept of citizenship existed only 
in the realm of ideas. In others, the idea materialised, and membership in 
the state (or city) and civic rights and obligations found a formal, legal ex-
pression. The formation of the idea and institution of citizenship is a long 
and multi-phase process.
Keywords: Citizenship, Citizen, Subjecthood, Subject, Evolution, History
Introduction
Citizenship is one of the essential categories defi ning human status. 
From a historical perspective, the idea of citizenship in Europe is in 
a state of constant evolution. Therefore, the essence of the institution of 
citizenship and its acquisition criteria are continually being transformed. 
Today, citizenship can be regarded as a (relatively) lasting link between 
an individual and a state, manifested formally as territorial state-mem-
bership and materially as a status of full participation in rights (including 
political ones) and obligations determined by the legal order of the state 
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concerned. However, the durability of citizenship, both temporal and spa-
tial, is not absolute which means that there may be an expiry, a change, 
a waiver, and even (especially in countries with a nondemocratic regime) 
the deprivation of citizenship in some cases.
Today’s comprehension of citizenship is different from understanding 
citizenship in Europe in earlier epochs of history. In some of them, the 
concept of citizenship existed only in the realm of ideas. In others, the 
idea materialised, and membership in the state (or city) and civic rights 
and obligations found a formal, legal expression. The formation of the 
idea and institution of citizenship is a long and multi-phase process.1 
This paper identifi es and synthetically demonstrates the most impor-
tant steps and changes in the evolution of the idea and institution of citi-
zenship in Europe over more than two thousand years. 
Ancient History
Two ancient models are crucial to the evolution of citizenship in Eu-
rope: Athenian and Roman. Originally citizenship was born in ancient 
Greek civilisation. Historical sources, especially the works of Aristotle,2 
suggest that citizenship was developed most maturely in Athens, although 
it was certainly no stranger to other cities-states of ancient Greece. Aris-
totle believed that the concept of a citizen is best defi ned by the ability to 
participate in courts and government. For Aristotle, a full citizen, a state 
being (zoon politikon), possessed political rights. These rights were never 
available to all residents of Athens.3 Initially, the group of citizens consisted 
exclusively of members of the wealthy aristocracy who owned land. They 
had the ability to arm themselves and defend the state. Solon’s reforms 
linked the possession of part of the rights (especially the dignity of holding 
offi ce) mainly to a property qualifi cation.4 On the other hand, Cleisthenes’ 
legislation created so-called new citizens from foreigners (metics) living 
permanently in Athens.5 However, it was Pericles (5th century BC) who 
ultimately shaped the right of citizenship, making its acquisition depend-
ent mostly on the birth of local citizens and, therefore, on origin.6
1  K. Trzciński, Obywatelstwo w Europie. Z dziejów idei i instytucji, Scholar, Warszawa 
2006.
2  See Aristotle, Politics; Constitution of the Athenians; Nicomachean Ethics. 
3  P.B. Manville, The Origins of Citizenship in Ancient Athens, Princeton NJ 1990, 
pp. 3–34.
4  M. Grant, The Rise of the Greeks, London 1987, pp. 47–48.
5  J.B. Bury, R. Meiggs, A History of Greece to the Death of Alexander the Great, Lon-
don 1975, pp. 136–138.
6  M. Grant, The Classical Greeks, London 1989, p. 69.
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Citizenship offered equality before the law (isonomia) and freedom 
(eleutheria). Equality meant both the same treatment of all citizens before 
the courts, equal opportunities in access to state functions, and equality 
of every vote in the people’s assembly. On the other hand, freedom was 
not just a denial of slavery because it involved civic activity. Freedom was 
perceived as responsible cooperation between all citizens for the common 
good. In principle, citizenship was also a profession because citizens’ ex-
ercise of political rights was paid for from the state budget.
Civic status had a clear material dimension since it afforded the ability 
to acquire land and testamentary succession law privileges.7 In some cases, 
it meant qualifi cation for state aid (access to benefi ts and food allocation). 
Citizenship was linked to various responsibilities, including military serv-
ice, state defence, and the payment of taxes. Citizenship in Athens became 
a kind of arrangement of interests – in the case of full (active) citizenship 
a simple principle was developed, according to which more rights went 
hand-in-hand with more responsibilities. Aristotle also distinguished the 
category of non-active (or passive) citizens, i.e., those subject to private-
law privileges (including a fundamental right of succession), but deprived 
of political rights. This group mainly included minors and women.8 The 
descendants’ rights depended on whether the mother had civic status (if 
she came from a family of Athenian citizens). Consequently, the son of an 
Athenian citizen and a foreign woman was treated as a foreigner even if 
he had been born and lived in Athens. Personal freedom, legal residence 
(domicile), and origin were the main characteristics of Athens’s restricted 
citizenship status. In the case of full citizenship, the age of maturity and 
gender (male) became additional requirements.9
Ancient Rome’s citizenship was initially formed in a municipal state, 
but unlike ancient Greece, it gradually expanded territorially. The fi rst 
full Roman citizens were free-born, wealthy men who had family ties 
with the town’s progenitors and had a political and military role. The 
development of Roman citizenship proceeded in two main ways. On the 
one hand, as mutatis mutandis did in Athens, it covered an ever-wider 
part of the native community (by establishing the institutions of the peo-
ple’s tribune, the law’s codifi cation by the law of the Twelve Tables, the 
introduction of the Lex Hortensia). On the other hand, it accompanied 
the expansion of Rome into new territories. However, the citizenship 
7  J.V.A. Fine, The Ancient Greeks. A Critical History, Cambridge MA 1983, p. 394.
8  A.J. Podlecki, Perikles and his Circle, London 1998, p. 159.
9  D. Whitehead, Norms of citizenship in Ancient Greece, in: Athens and Rome, Flor-
ence and Venice: City-States in Classical Antiquity and Medieval Italy, eds. A. Molho, 
K. Raafl aub, J. Emlen, Ann Arbor MI 1991, pp. 135–154.
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rights of all free residents of Rome in the 3rd century BC did not auto-
matically apply to the population of conquered areas. The Romans ap-
plied the principle of the personality of the law, according to which a res-
ident of an empire from outside the capital was treated in it according to 
the legal rules in force in the place of his birth (original residence). The 
principle of the personality of law is the opposite of the current principle 
of territoriality of law.
The Romans used citizenship to reward individuals and even entire 
communities.10 This practice was already known in Athens. However, 
on Roman soil it did not have to be a reward for merit, and for example 
could be applied to those who won in a trial with a Roman offi cial. The 
equalisation of rights with Romans was nevertheless infrequent, which 
only reinforced demand among Rome’s allies for the spread of Roman 
citizenship.11 In the 1st century BC, Roman citizenship was endowed 
to the Italic peoples. During the Empire, Caracalla (212 AD) granted 
citizenship to almost all imperial inhabitants, considering permanent 
residence (domicilium) as a primary condition for its possession, in ad-
dition to personal freedom.12 Before the spread of Roman citizenship, 
it was possible to hold dual citizenship.13 This institution, unknown 
in Athens, occurred in Rome mainly when a citizen of a city located in 
a Roman province obtained an empire’s citizenship without renouncing 
their previous status. A qualitative change in its content accompanied 
the spatial expansion of Roman citizenship. Before the edict of Cara-
calla, citizenship was very closed and elitist and for its depositaries rep-
resented a kind of dignity that was clearly downgraded when citizenship 
became a universal good. This transformation was the culmination of 
weakening political rights in that era, which had initially constituted 
the essence of citizenship. However, at the same time, it included a sys-
tem of extensive Roman private law for the population of a considerable 
part of the then known world. In ancient Athens, political freedom gave 
full substance to the institution of citizenship, while in Rome, in the 
days of the Republic, political rights were losing value as democracy 
withered. The Romans consequently developed a citizenship model in 
which equality before the law was a priority over (the possibility) of ac-
tive participation in political life.14
10  A.N. Sherwin-White, The Roman Citizenship, Oxford 1939, pp. 327–328.
11  F. Schulz, Classical Roman Law, Oxford 1961, p. 79.
12  K. Christ, The Romans, Berkeley 1984, p. 18.
13  O. Dawn, D. Heater, The Foundations of Citizenship, London 1994, pp. 10, 24; 
K. Christ, The Romans, op. cit., p. 82.
14  See: Marcus Tullius Cicero, On the Republic; On the Laws; On Duties.
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Roman citizenship was strictly juridical in nature and constituted an 
extensive catalogue of individual rights.15 Of fundamental importance 
here was legal capacity, which was determined by the state of freedom 
and the position occupied in the family. Only an individual with per-
sonal freedom could become a Roman citizen. However, the presence of 
different legal quasi-slavery categories, which included “semi-free” indi-
viduals, complicated the clear division into free and non-free persons.16 
It seems more accurate to distinguish between free-born and freedmen. 
Such a distinction was crucial from the point of view of the law of citizen-
ship. Unlike the Athenians, the Romans gave emancipated slaves civil 
status, although this was incomplete.17 Freedmen as cives non optimo iure 
had only partial voting rights. The most severe for them, however, was 
the limited ius conubii (capacity to enter into a legally recognised marriage 
to a Roman citizen), the complete absence of ius honorum (the right to be 
elected to public offi ce), and the need to stay in the former owner’s (pa-
tron’s) custody and the compulsion to provide various services to them).
In Rome, the equivalent of Athenian limited citizenship of women and 
men unable to serve in the army was civitas sine suffragio. This “semi-cit-
izenship” deprived women and minors of the opportunity to participate 
in public affairs. For a long time, it was also connected to their limited 
position in the family, including the subjection to the head of the fam-
ily’s will. Such dependents were also deprived of legal capacity to possess 
property (or it was limited). Although women were able to obtain it fully 
in the absence of dependence on marital or parental authority, this never 
led to their obtaining political rights.18 On the other hand, men’s citizen-
ship became more complete the older they were and more independent 
of parental authority. This situation stood in contrast to the Athenian 
model, in which young men became citizens with full rights after reach-
ing the age of maturity. Therefore, with some simplifi cation, it can be 
concluded that Rome’s full citizenship was held by free-born and materi-
ally independent adult men whose parents were Roman citizens. Such 
cives optimo iure had all private and public rights and were subject to civil 
obligations in accordance with the principles of allegiance (obedientia) and 
service (offi cium) for the good of the state.
15  K. Trzciński, op. cit., pp. 50–54.
16  P. Garnsey, R. Saller, The Roman Empire: Economy, Society and Culture, Berkeley 
CA 1987, pp. 111–112.
17  M.H. Hansen, Demokracja ateńska w czasach Demostenesa. Struktura, zasady 
i ideologia, Warszawa 1999, pp. 105–106.
18  A. Arjava, Women and Roman Law in Late Antiquity, Helsinki 1994, pp. 296–
297.
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Medieval Ages and Renaissance
Citizenship once again found its way into cities in large areas of me-
dieval Europe. However, unlike the Greek poleis, these cities usually 
were not states, but only a part of them, so municipal citizenship was 
rather a limited phenomenon. Its creation is related to the system of es-
tate monarchy and the separation of the commoners’ estate.19 The urban 
population was initially heavily dependent on feudal power, which was 
a signifi cant obstacle to securing its personal freedom and the inviolabil-
ity of property. However, the communal movement cleverly exploited the 
rivalry between the nobility and the monarchic authority, obtaining for 
cities a broad autonomy guaranteed by the statutes, which created the 
citizen as an entity with urban rights.20
Being a citizen of a medieval European city depended on several re-
quirements.21 The following must be considered as basic: domicile (per-
manent residence intra muros), origin from a family of citizens (right of 
blood, jus sanguinis), or at least birth in the city (right of soil, jus soli). 
However, over time municipal authorities began to introduce new condi-
tions for access to citizenship, including, in particular, the ownership of 
immovable property, which guaranteed tax revenues to the local treasury. 
Besides, municipal citizens’ recommendations, birth in lawful wedlock, 
local marriage, “legitimate” religion, or good reputation (bona fama) were 
often necessary to become citizens of European cities. Ultimately, the 
granting of citizenship to strangers had to be according to the general 
criterion of usefulness for the municipal community, which is why, in ad-
dition to wealthy persons, skilled craftsmen were often preferred.
Restricting access to citizenship was by no means just about new-
comers, but also about the city-dwellers themselves.22 Initially, the civic 
community at least nominally included all free residents, but with the 
progressive monopolisation of power by wealthier citizens (cives maiores), 
who were usually property owners, the preserving of many rights was 
usually associated with the condition of affl uence. Over time, municipal 
citizenship gradually lost its universality, and an empowered well-to-do 
citizen (civis) contrasted a disempowered, less well-off “ordinary” resi-
19  J. Huizinga, Jesień średniowiecza, Warszawa 1961, pp. 80–81.
20  J.N. Claster, The Medieval Experience: 300–1400, New York University Press, 
New York 1982, p. 243.
21  D. Quaglioni, The Legal Defi nition of Citizenship in the Late Middle Ages, in: City-
States in Classical Antiquity and Medieval Italy: Athens and Rome, Florence and Venice, 
eds. A. Molho, K. Raafl aub, J. Emlen, Stuttgart 1991, pp. 155–167.
22  P. Riesenberg, Citizenship in the Western Tradition: Plato to Rousseau, Chapel Hill 
NC 1992, pp. 107, 116.
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dent (incola).23 This division translated into the existing social strata in 
the city. Therefore, the category of the municipal citizens included, in the 
fi rst place, members of the patriciate, but also the commonality, while the 
category of “excluded” from citizenship covered mostly plebs (vulgus) who 
did not pay municipal taxes.24 However, in practice, the patriciate control-
led the municipal authorities, making of the commonality second-class 
citizens. Therefore, the possibility of universal participation in selecting 
the municipal authorities and the infl uence of the general public on the 
community’s affairs, so symptomatic at least for males at the beginnings 
of urban self-government, over time became a myth.
The catalogue of groundbreaking (as for the Middle Ages) city freedoms 
included, inter alia, personal freedom (prohibition of imprisonment with-
out the permission of the court that stood in opposition to feudal serfdom 
– it is refl ected in the famous principle “Stadluft macht frei”), freedom of 
movement, testation, and inheritance, as well as the freedom to perform 
any profession.25 In addition, at least some citizens enjoyed political rights 
permitting participation in the election of authorities and in assemblies 
enacting local laws, setting taxes and determining spending of the city’s 
revenues. However, the medieval city citizen appeared to be more homo 
oeconomicus than homo politicus, for whom protectionist economic laws, 
especially customs freedoms, were of particular importance.26 Rights have 
traditionally been linked to tax obligations, the duty to serve in the city 
guards, and to defend the city.
Over time, the freedoms enjoyed by citizens of medieval cities became 
attractive to other state members. One of the fi rst acts of law to ensure the 
broader part of society’s protection against monarchal willfulness was the 
English Great Charter of Freedoms of 1215. During this period, the fi rst 
representative assemblies were formed in Europe, which grouped into the 
so-called political nation. From now on, more prosperous or better-educated 
subjects became increasingly infl uential in the state, and the sphere of gen-
eral freedom of individuals slowly expanded. The emancipation of the upper 
layers of the state’s population was accompanied by the development of Euro-
pean socio-political thought, which refreshed the ancient idea of state citizen-
ship and, rather unsuccessfully, tried to transpose it into medieval reality. 
23  J. Le Goff, Kultura średniowiecznej Europy, Warszawa 1994, p. 284.
24  H. Samsonowicz, Życie miasta średniowiecznego, Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, Po-
znań 2001, p. 54.
25  K. Trzciński, Geneza i istota średniowiecznego obywatelstwa miejskiego na 
zachodzie Europy. Przyczynek do badań dziejów obywatelstwa państwowego, „Państwo 
i Społeczeństwo”, no. 3/2004, pp. 75–91.
26  M. Weber, The City, New York 1962, p. 227.
14
Studia Europejskie – Studies in European Affairs, 1/2021
The theoretical concepts of citizenship promoted not only its trans-lo-
cal specifi city but often also its universal character. And so, Dante Aligh-
ieri stressed the need to guarantee state members’ freedom by introducing 
the rule of law.27 John of Paris viewed the state as a collective of all citizens 
(politia communis) who should have the right to choose their authorities.28 
Marsilius of Padua clearly formulated the thesis on the sovereignty of the 
people and called a citizen every free entity that participated in the com-
munity’s life and had an infl uence on the rule of the state.29 In the 15th 
century, the Florentine writer and politician Leonardo Bruni openly as-
sociated universal citizenship with the state’s development and its mem-
bers’ prosperity.30 In the Renaissance era, Niccolò Machiavelli opted for 
universal and full-fl edged citizenship and saw the best conditions for its 
development in the republican system.31 It was there that all estate divi-
sions could be effectively abolished while preserving wealth differences 
in society.
Early Modern Period
The middle ages became the starting point for later models of state 
citizenship and the modern theory of personal rights. Nevertheless, in 
the early modern period, the development of citizenship was seriously 
slowed down, which was primarily linked to the advent in many Europe-
an countries of the era of absolute monarchies and the slow decadence of 
municipal citizenship. Paradoxically, the progressive twilight of this form 
of citizenship also meant the state’s gradual takeover of its legal solutions. 
However, future state-wide citizenship – extending the scope of its rights 
to a broader part of state members – could only develop in opposition to 
municipal citizenship.32 
Meanwhile, the rise of absolutism in much of Europe was achieved by 
restricting individual rights, eliminating (or diminishing the weight of) 
estate assemblies, and highlighting the omnipotent monarch-legislator’s 
role. All subjects in this regime were subjected to a centralised monar-
chical authority system, which at a time of many wars on the European 
27  See: Dante Alighieri, De Monarchia.
28  See: John of Paris (Jean Quidort), De potestate regia et papali.
29  See: Marsilius of Padua, Defensor pacis.
30  See: Leonardo Bruni, Laudatio; Preface to the Translation of Aristotle’s “The Poli-
tics”; Oration for the Funeral of Nanni Strozzi.
31  See: Niccolò Machiavelli, Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livius; Art of 
War; Florentine Histories; The Prince.
32  R. Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany, Cambridge MA 
1992, p. 42.
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continent seemed to guarantee state’s members’ security. This was the 
period of the beginning of the formation of nation states, and nation-
ality as belonging to an ethnocultural community implied in principle 
territorial state-membership (Staatsangehörigkeit).33 In the reality of an 
absolutist state, Staatsangehörigkeit of the whole population, combined 
with its subordination to the monarch’s sovereign power, is called state 
subjecthood. The essence of this condition was the priority of the rights 
belonging to the state, personifi ed by the ruler (“L’État, c’est moi”), over 
the subjects’ rights and, at the same time, emphasis on the obligations of 
the subjects to the state (ruler).
Paradoxically, subjecthood – seemingly regressive to the institutions of 
municipal citizenship – was an important bridge on the way to the build-
ing of state citizenship since it weakened the estate and feudal order and 
defi ned the state of subordination of individuals to the central authority 
and at the same time membership in a particular state.34 Therefore, sub-
jecthood established a clear external demarcation between indigenes and 
foreigners. By contrast, in the estate monarchy, municipal citizenship was 
an indicator of the internal division between a state’s members often from 
within the same ethnic community, albeit differentiated by their belong-
ing to various estates. However, the institution of subjecthood equated 
the entire population of the state not in rights but obligations to and de-
pendence on one ruler. Despite its shortcomings, this condition undoubt-
edly contributed to the constitution of nations.35
It is hardly surprising that some scholars discern some features of 
citizenship in the subjective realities of an absolute monarchy. This has 
to do with the fact that, despite the much-limited freedom of the state’s 
members, the absolutist system respected some of their essential rights. 
A subject to the absolute monarch was therefore often referred to as a citi-
zen with limited rights. Such a passive citizen was a “disenfranchised” 
subject to the crown, who enjoyed the right to life, personal freedom and 
usually had a guarantee of inviolability of their property. The limits of 
“civil” freedom were based on growing legalism, which limited the ruler’s 
absolutism.
Amid the realities of the epoch, one apologist of absolutism Jean Bodin 
created a passive citizen’s conceptual model.36 According to this 16th-cen-
tury thinker, the attribute of a member of civitas was not to have political 
freedom – as Aristotle had formulated many centuries earlier – but to be 
33  K. Trzciński, Obywatelstwo w Europie…, op. cit., pp. 13–14, 184, 241–242.
34  S.E. Finer, Empires, Monarchies and the Modern State, Oxford 1999, pp. 1298–1299.
35  K. Trzciński, Obywatelstwo w Europie…, op. cit., pp. 101–108.
36  See: Jean Bodin, The Six Books of the Republic.
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personally free and subject to the ruler’s sovereignty. Moreover, citizens 
were not at all characterised by equality before the law since their position 
in the state depended on such different factors as social origin, gender, 
age, or merit. Too hasty, however, would be the conclusion that citizen-
ship remains in this concept nothing more than upgraded subjecthood. 
Since Bodin came to the important conclusion that citizenship could 
mean a political-legal relationship, a mutual commitment, according to 
which the sovereign, in exchange for the fi delity and obedience of his 
subjects, must serve them justice, and help and protect them. The quasi-
citizenship was thus understood, in essence, primarily as a state of bind-
ing the citizen-subject with the sovereign, as well as with the territory 
over which he exercised his power.37
A signifi cantly different approach to the question of the human posi-
tion in the state was presented by a 16th-century English legal researcher 
Thomas Smith, who analysed the process of conceptual revaluing of the 
term “citizen” and separating it from the concept of burger (city-dweller).38 
This scholar clearly recognised the aberration of a situation in which cer-
tain state members were entitled to some rights just because of their resi-
dence place (city). In Aristotle’s spirit, he also stated that a citizen is an 
individual with a real infl uence on power. Smith went even further since 
he considered as citizens those individuals who held state or municipal 
positions and therefore formed a “political nation”. However, given the 
epoch’s realities, this privilege still had to correspond with their wealth, 
and in part with education.
A more important practical meaning during this period was manifested 
in extension of the sphere of individual autonomy of state members, guar-
anteed by the landmark legislation – the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 and 
the Bill of Rights of 1689. These British legal achievements inspired the 
remarkable individuality of John Locke, who became a proponent of nat-
ural human rights: the right to life, personal freedom, and property.39 He 
may have been the fi rst to make a clear distinction between human rights 
and citizens’ rights. Locke regarded the former as natural rights and the 
latter as arising from a social contract constituting the state. Locke basi-
cally became the creator of the idea of the personal rights of the individual 
living in the community. This community, known as “civil society”, was 
based on a jointly established law equal to all members. However, equal-
37  K. Trzciński, A Reversal of Perspective: The Subject as Citizen under Absolute 
Monarchy, or the Ambiguity of Notions, in: The State and Development in Africa and Other 
Regions, ed. K. Trzciński, Warsaw 2007, pp. 319–332.
38  See: Thomas Smith, De Republica Anglorum.
39  See: John Locke, Two Treatises of Government.
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ity of rights did not imply the universality of political rights, restricted 
in Locke’s thought by the property qualifi cation. The property owned 
by citizens (often in correlation with education) was proof of a sense of 
responsibility and maturity to lead the state’s affairs.
Enlightenment
Locke’s thought accelerated the formation of an Enlightenment world-
view that openly opposed absolutist power and restriction of human free-
dom.40 A measurable example of this was the view of Montesquieu, who 
considered that a state of affairs in which state members have no infl uence 
on authority is incompatible with the “spirit of rights”.41 Montesquieu 
promoted the idea of establishing authority whose character corresponds 
to the needs of the people. In fact, it was nothing more than a cry for civil 
liberties, especially the emancipation of the commoners’ estate. In this 
concept, political freedom was supposed to be the backbone of a rule-of-
law state. However, access to it was still dependent on the state of own-
ership. Consequently, political rights were intended to serve only those 
who, because of their wealth, possibly their education or the dignity they 
held, were aware of how to exercise them.
As an indicator of the state members’ political freedom, the question 
of ownership strongly contrasted with the vision of the state and society 
outlined by Jean-Jacques Rousseau.42 His citizenship model generally 
involved equality of all state members also in the domain of political 
rights (universal will), which was a real infl uence in the creation of state 
authorities and the adoption of laws (sovereignty of the people). On the 
other hand, the citizenry took the supreme legislator’s full form when 
it was competent to pass the law through democracy, not so much rep-
resentative but rather direct. This bold universal citizenship proposal 
signifi cantly expanded the political freedom of state members, but at 
the same time, interestingly, limited their property rights. According to 
Rousseau, wealth inequality determined social divisions, leading directly 
to human enslavement, and thus became the main enemy of citizenship’s 
universality. 
40  K. Trzciński, Myśl europejska w poszukiwaniu defi nicji obywatela. Rzecz 
o koncepcjach statusu jednostki w państwie przed przełomem rewolucji francuskiej. Kontekst 
historyczny, podobieństwa i różnice, znaczenie, „Przegląd Humanistyczny”, no. 3/2006, 
pp. 59–81.
41  See: Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws.
42  See: Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract; A Discourse on Political 
Economy.
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The issue of citizenship was raised in his work by another great lumi-
nary of the Enlightenment, Immanuel Kant. He attempted to create an 
ideal state model with a “civic” system based on a common legal order 
for all its members.43 Kant was one of the fi rst modern thinkers to make 
a clear distinction between territorial state-membership (Staatsangehörig-
keit) and citizenship (Staatsbürgerschaft). The Staatsangehörigkeit deter-
mined the external division between the indigenes and foreigners and 
implied a basic catalogue of rights and obligations for the whole group of 
the former. The Staatsbürgerschaft generated an internal division of state 
members and meant full public rights and unfettered participation in 
state affairs by a part of the community called active citizens. The passive 
citizens, although subject to the law, could not participate in its creation. 
The possibility of acquiring a full “civic personality” had to be linked 
once again to obtaining economic independence. The Kantian idea of cit-
izenship was a denial of Rousseau’s universal citizenship concept, but it 
was a reasonable proposal, taking into account the epoch’s reality. Moreo-
ver, Kant’s thought did not put a simple sign of equality between human 
beings’ freedoms and civil rights.
French Revolution
The French Revolution, especially its “The Declaration of the Rights 
of Man and of the Citizen” of 1789, brought the fi rst modern legal con-
struction of state citizenship in Europe. The ideological foundation 
for this landmark piece of legislation was provided, inter alia, by Mon-
tesquieu’s and Rousseau’s work. The direct patterns of the Declaration, 
on the other hand, can be seen in the American “Virginia Declaration of 
Rights” and the “Declaration of Independence” of 1776, which in turn 
drew largely from the thought of John Locke. Not only did the French 
Revolution overthrow the absolutist order in France, it liberated the de-
velopment forces dormant in the third state (commoners, bourgeois) and 
introduced a republican system (by no means irrevocably), but above all, 
it emancipated the human individual and radically changed their posi-
tion in the state. The National Constituent Assembly members who en-
acted the Declaration did not precisely delineate human rights from civil 
rights, but coexisted in symbiosis.
The Declaration explicitly introduced a category of personal rights. 
The document considered freedom, ownership, security, and resistance 
against oppression to be the citizen and man’s essential attributes. Free-
43  See: Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals.
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dom was defi ned as the possibility for anyone to do anything that does 
not harm the other, and the end of such freedom could only be defi ned by 
legal act.44 The law could only prohibit what was harmful to society, and 
anything that was not prohibited was to be allowed.45
While the entire catalogue of human rights announced in the Declara-
tion was also the same as that of a citizen, not all French citizens’ rights 
had to apply to the whole human race. The following can be regarded as 
strictly civil: the principle of the supremacy of the people, equality before 
the law, freedom of belief, expression and printing, or the broad political 
rights of individuals in the state in general. However, was it realistic to as-
sign these landmark regulations to a particular place and nation? History 
has clearly shown that it did not. Indeed, the Declaration’s guiding provi-
sions entered into most European countries’ constitutions over the next 
two centuries. Nevertheless, only some members of a particular political 
organism initially enjoyed all the civic rights.
The idea of universal civil rights outlined in the Declaration charters 
had to wait a long time for its practical implementation. Its content was 
a too fragile social modus vivendi. A deep refl ection came soon after the 
document was enacted. On the one hand, the Declaration was criticised 
for not exhausting civil liberties as it especially lacked a provision on 
freedom of association. On the other hand, it was accused of creating po-
litically immature and uneducated “new” citizens who were given many 
different rights while having no responsibilities. Therefore, it is not sur-
prising that the Electoral Act, which was only delivered a few months 
after the Declaration, introduced at the initiative of Emmanuel-Joseph 
Sieyès a property (or rather tax) qualifi cation. It effectively divided the 
civic body into passive citizens (citoyens passifs) and active citizens (citoy-
ens actifs), with the right to vote given only to the latter.
In France’s fi rst constitution, adopted in 1791, domicile was used pri-
marily to identify the citizen. The essential and repeatedly emphasised, 
in this document, right of blood defi ning the “qualité de français” was 
linked to the right of soil in terms of foreigners who, living in France, 
became citizens if they were born there. Therefore, the constitution rec-
ognised as the fundamental determinants of citizenship: residence place, 
origin, and place of birth. These determinants guaranteed state member-
ship with several fundamental rights, but political rights were still deter-
mined by wealth as the essence of active citizenship.
The dissatisfaction of passive citizens with their overt discrimination 
in the state led to the adoption in 1793 (by the National Convention, con-
44  The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789, art. IV.
45  Ibidem, art. V.
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stituted in almost universal suffrage) of a new constitution and the ac-
companying revised and expanded Declaration of the Rights of Man and 
the Citizen. In principle, it was made by, known for their later terror, the 
Jacobins under Maximilien Robespierre. At the beginning of the revolu-
tion he was already among staunch critics of the limitations of citizens’ 
political rights, arguing that each individual has the right to participate in 
adopting laws that governed them and in the public administration. Oth-
erwise, it would not be true that all French people were equal and that eve-
ryone was a state citizen. Consequently, the 1793 Declaration emphasised 
the previously violated principle of equality for all citizens.46 Equality had 
been placed before goods such as freedom, security, and property.47
Progressive and universal social rights to work, social welfare, and 
education have also grown out of the principle of equality since public 
support was considered as a “sacred debt” and education as the need of 
all.48 The Jacobin Declaration’s importance for developing the idea of citi-
zenship lies primarily in promoting social rights.
On the other hand, the new Declaration of the Rights and Duties of 
Man and of the Citizen of 1795 appeared to be a seemingly retrograde 
step. However, it is worth noting that it contained civic duties omitted in 
the two previous Declarations. The new act required state members to re-
spect the letter of the law and the authorities, pay taxes fairly, and comply 
with their defence obligations.
The French Revolution represented a real breakthrough in the cen-
turies-old development of citizenship.49 First, the theoretical products of 
enlightenment and previous socio-political thought could, by trial and 
error, be put into practice at the national level by a large European state. 
The confrontation between theory and practice was undoubtedly brutal. 
However, it demonstrated the need for a more fl exible adaptation of the 
state authorities to its members’ needs in the future. 
Secondly, the revolutionary changes gave anachronistic importance to 
the status of a subject. A subject, understood as a member of one of the 
estates entirely dependent on the absolute monarch, was transformed into 
a citizen, understood – in the most subtle form – as a benefi ciary of per-
sonal rights and equality before the law shared with other fellow citizens. 
This status, constitutionally guaranteed, had signifi cant value, especially 
46  Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen of 1793, art. XXIX.
47  Ibidem, art. II.
48  Ibidem, art. XXI and XXII.
49  K. Trzciński, Początki nowożytnego obywatelstwa w Europie – obywatel państwa 
i katalog jego praw w dokumentach Rewolucji Francuskiej, „Studia Europejskie”, no. 
2/2005, pp. 67–94.
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in terms of personal integrity and the individual’s property inviolability. 
Universal equality before the law, and therefore the possibility of equally 
asserting one’s rights before a court, meant forming a civil community 
consisting of members enjoying the same freedoms. It was a denial of 
both the essence of estate realities and municipal citizenship status, once 
their byproduct.
Thirdly, the French Revolution in the Jacobin legal acts created a civ-
ic community model in which the gender qualifi cation and the (under-
standably) age qualifi cation were in principle the only limits on the uni-
versality of political rights. It was a somewhat abstract achievement but 
simultaneously indicating the future direction of the legal institution of 
citizenship’s evolution.
Fourthly, the legal defi nition of citizenship strengthened the national 
character of the state. Consequently, the more widespread the concept of 
a state citizen became in national law, the more obvious became the con-
trast to the concept of a foreigner or a citizen of another state. However, 
the accompanying process was the development of solutions that provide 
for the possibility of granting citizenship to foreigners who meet certain 
conditions and, above all, who had a suffi ciently long domicile.
Fifthly and fi nally, universal state citizenship – taking on the dimen-
sion of national citizenship and delimitating borders of a homogeneous 
civic community to which almost exclusively the inhabitants of the state 
(usually born there) belonged – created conditions for legal discrimina-
tion against foreigners and inspired the subsequent fl ourishing of the ide-
ology and politics of nationalism.50 At the same time, however, citizenship 
cemented among civic community members a sense of attachment to the 
state and built a real civic bond between its depositaries, reinforcing the 
importance of terms such as homeland and patriotism. 
The Nineteenth Century
After the French Revolution, the directions that the development of 
the idea of citizenship followed were determined by critical historical 
events, including the fi nal elimination of serfdom and the revolutionary 
upheaval of the Springtime of the Peoples. The latter occurrence made 
supporters of absolutist power aware of the inevitability of giving politi-
cal rights to a more signifi cant part of the state’s adult members and were 
essential for the general evolution of personal rights and freedoms on 
the European continent in the 19th century. An important step in the 
50  R. Brubaker, op. cit., pp. 43–48.
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development of nation-states was the unifi cations of Germany and Italy. 
However, the newly created states often did not focus on their members’ 
civil liberties but on consolidating their unity.51 The Italian ideologist G. 
Mazzini and other 19th-century nationalists argued that the state’s bor-
ders should be in line with the borders of a nation understood in the 
ethnocultural sense. Nation-states, in defence of their interests, increas-
ingly closed themselves to foreign citizens or subjects. Consequently, citi-
zenship acquired the characteristics of an exclusive external demarcation. 
The proliferation of passports and visas became a tangible, formal expres-
sion of this trend. A signifi cant context here was substantial population 
growth in European countries and associated economic migrations.
Meanwhile, in the 19th century, the division into two contrasting citi-
zenship patterns was clearly detected at the conceptual level. The fi rst 
is primarily associated with the thought of previous epochs’ luminaries 
such as Aristotle, Machiavelli, and Rousseau and is called the republi-
can or classical concept of citizenship. The second is referred to as a lib-
eral model, and its beginnings are traced to the ideas of John Locke, and 
its development in the works of Wilhelm von Humboldt,52 Benjamin 
Constant,53 and John Stuart Mill.54 This distinction is linked to the char-
acteristic abandonment of several French Revolutionary ideals, especially 
in the 19th century, and evolving a liberal, individualistic approach to 
issues related to state members’ status. 
In the post-Enlightenment period, the classical concept began to give 
way to the liberal one. From the perspective of republican tradition, citi-
zenship was perceived through the prism of the exercise of full political 
rights and, consequently, as active participation in the community. The 
republican spirit of citizenship not only presupposed the possibility of 
active involvement in state affairs but even a kind of duty to act for the 
common good, which appeared in principle to test the individual’s civ-
ic attitudes. The liberal concept of citizenship was created not only in 
opposition to its republican predecessor but also in contradiction to de-
mocracy in general. This antagonism manifested itself mainly in a dif-
ferent understanding of the essence of an individual’s civil status in 
a state. For liberal philosophy, individual rights were a priority, not the 
51  K. Trzciński, Prawo obywatelstwa a zagadnienia imigracji na tle doświadczeń 
niemieckich, „Państwo i Prawo”, no. 2/2003, pp. 64-77.
52  See: W. von Humboldt, Ideen zu einem Versuch, die Grenzen der Wirksamkeit des 
Staats zu bestimmen.
53  See: B. Constant, The Liberty of Ancients Compared with that of Moderns; Prin-
ciples of Politics Applicable to All Governments.
54  See: John Stuart Mill, On Liberty. 
23
K. Trzciński, Citizenship in Europe: The Main Stages of Development…
common good. Moreover, this philosophy paid more attention to civic 
rights rather than obligations. In its classical form, liberalism saw state 
power as a body that upholds citizens’ security, freedom, and property. 
Consequently, liberals were more interested in whether the government 
was doing its job and therefore serving the state members’ interests than 
in what portion of them took part in its creation. Citizens, by defi nition, 
did not directly constitute power in this concept but made that obligation 
via their representatives in accordance with the principle of representa-
tive governments. An important aspect of liberal thought, but at the same 
time a kind of deviation from the principles of democracy, was – often 
twistedly argued or presented only implicitly – the refusal to grant all 
state members of political rights. While denying the universality of the 
passive and active right to vote, liberals simultaneously preached equality 
for all citizens before the law.
However, according to liberal thinkers, this antinomy was only a sham. 
The liberal concept of citizenship referred to the rules of the law of nature 
and, as a result, defended such fundamental goods for individuals as free-
dom, equality, and private property. These rights were still to come from 
the state of nature. On the other hand, state power was a novum typical for 
a political state (nation-state) and had to be elected according to rules that 
did not exist in the pre-state period. Therefore, natural human freedom 
did not imply political freedom at all, and equality meant, in principle, 
the same position before the law for all. State power was mainly estab-
lished to protect private property and therefore had to act rationally. For 
this to happen, it should be made up of responsible people. The maturity 
of political freedom could, above all, be demonstrated by the high mate-
rial position and the education of the citizen.
Liberalism, assuming the lack of universality of voting rights, promot-
ed at the same time a number of other rights having political connotation 
(freedom of expression, printing, assembly, association), which over time 
had to inevitably lead to the universalisation of voting rights and, there-
fore, to a change in an essential part of the whole concept. Liberal thought 
fi nally recognised the importance of full political freedom and gave it the 
value of guaranteeing freedom in other areas of human life. J.S. Mill was 
the forerunner of this trend.55 However, the individual’s legal position in 
the state and their autonomy vis-à-vis the state have always remained at 
the heart of citizenship in liberal terms. Equal and personal treatment of 
citizens by state power was manifested in the demands of liberals, such 
as the personal integrity of the individual, freedom of religion, freedom 
55  See: John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government.
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of conscience, the secrecy of correspondence, and the inviolability of resi-
dence. These rights created and guaranteed – unlimited by the state au-
thorities – the individual sphere of privacy.56
In the 19th and early decades of the 20th century, European legisla-
tors were fascinated by the idea of constitutionally guaranteed civil rights 
that corresponded to the liberal concept of citizenship. A characteristic 
feature of the beginnings of the whole trend of constitutionalism in the 
Old Continent was the imitation of at least some of the solutions proposed 
in the French Declaration of 1789.57 It was originally held on two levels: 
personal rights and freedoms and political rights. Among the European 
countries with the most important constitutional acquis in regulating in-
dividuals’ status during this period are France, Belgium, Germany, and 
Austria. Virtually every constitution adopted in these countries referred 
more narrowly or broadly to the rights enjoyed by citizens (or subjects), 
less often to human beings as such. 
The Twentieth Century
British sociologist T.H. Marshall is the creator of what is now consid-
ered a classic three-member typology of civil rights, which provides an 
in-depth analysis of modern citizenship in evolutionary terms.58 This re-
searcher drew attention to the permanent process of enriching the idea of 
citizenship with new content, starting from the 18th century to the 20th 
century. His pattern of the increase in new civil rights was presented in 
the example of the United Kingdom. However, it is a logical order with 
mutatis mutandis reference to many other European countries. From 
Marshall’s perspective, territorial state-membership was enriched in the 
18th century with some fundamental personal rights and freedoms (civil 
citizenship) that strengthened the position of man in the state, including 
personal freedom, equality before the law, property and contract rights, 
freedom of religion and conscience, freedom of expression and belief, 
the right of association. The 19th century was mainly associated with 
the development of political rights (political citizenship), especially the 
promotion of their fundamental essence: active and passive voting rights 
in local and parliamentary elections. This state was an inevitable conse-
quence of the French Revolution and an outcome of industrial societies’ 
56  K. Trzciński, Obywatelstwo w Europie…, op. cit., pp. 169–180.
57  S.E. Finer, Notes Towards a History of Constitutions, in: Constitutions in Democratic 
Politics, ed. V. Bogdanor, Aldershot 1988, pp. 27–28.
58  T.H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class, in: idem, Class, Citizenship and So-
cial Development: Essays by T.H. Marshall, Chicago 1977, pp. 71–134.
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formation and education’s progressive development. However, political 
freedom was, in fact, limited for a long time, largely by means of electoral 
laws armed with various qualifi cations. The fl agship example of this state 
of affairs was the United Kingdom, where the division between active 
and passive citizens was extremely persistent. The British evolution of 
universal suffrage lasted for a century and concerned the fi rst decades of 
the 20th century. According to Marshall, however, the 20th century was 
part of the history of the development of citizenship institutions mainly 
through the introduction of a number of social rights (social citizenship), 
allowing every citizen to enjoy a basic level of economic and social well-
being, including the right to education and various social benefi ts.59
Although rational and convincing, Marshall’s concept had one fun-
damental drawback – it referred, especially in the matter of the political 
rights of citizenship, to the male part of state societies. The 19th century 
became for men the fi nal period of the property qualifi cation for having 
voting rights. However, the principle of equality of all citizens remained 
defective long after political rights were granted to all men of legal age in 
the state since, at that time, the category of passive citizens usually still ex-
isted and applied to women. The idea of citizenship in Europe was strictly 
patriarchal during its long evolution, which was inextricably linked to the 
societies’ social organisation in which men played a dominant role. In the 
19th century, J.S. Mill loudly demanded the granting of voting rights to 
women.60 His harsh criticism of men’s social and political domination and 
patriarchal family relations aimed to make legislators aware that since 
a monarchess could hold the highest political offi ce in the state and did 
so signifi cantly (while betraying an innate ability to govern, such as it was 
in cases of Queen Victoria and Queen Elizabeth I), a woman could make 
an informed choice of her political representatives as well. However, in 
an age of strong emphasis on national ideas, a woman began to be seen 
not only through the prism of her position in the family as a wife and 
mother but also as a symbol of the nation’s existential continuity. There 
is no doubt that the actual determinant of the quality of women’s citizen-
ship status in different European countries was that they had the same 
rights as men. In some European countries, educational equality and, in 
the case of certain professions, occupational equality between women and 
men was achieved at the end of the 19th century. Nevertheless, the radical 
change in women’s status in the state came only in the fi rst decades of the 
20th century, when they were fi nally endowed with full active and passive 
59  T.H. Marshall, Social Selection in the Welfare State, in: idem, Sociology at the 
Crossroads: And Other Essays, London 1963, pp. 245–266.
60  See: John Stuart Mill, The Subjection of Women.
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electoral rights in many European countries (e.g., in Norway in 1913, in 
Poland in 1918, in the United Kingdom in 1928). However, in some Eu-
ropean countries, it happened only in the second half of the 20th century 
(e.g., in Greece in 1952, in Switzerland in 1971, in Portugal in 1976).61
In the second half of the 20th century, citizenship lost part of its her-
metic character, so that the very idea was perhaps even devalued. This 
occurred because, so far related mainly to citizenship and guaranteed by 
state law, the catalogue of rights enjoyed by an individual began to be 
governed by international legal acts and acquired universal status.62 How-
ever, this universalism is not about general access by state members to 
rights that are the essence of citizenship, which became a reality in most 
European countries as early as the fi rst half of the century. It is about the 
real inclusion in a system of transnational protection of individuals in 
the sense of humans, not just citizens. The international legitimisation 
of human rights has led to their position being regarded as dominant in 
relation to the concept of citizens’ rights.
However, the introduction of the human rights category in internation-
al law does not automatically extend the rights of members of a particular 
state, enjoyed because of their citizenship, to all humans. In particular, po-
litical rights (including the right to hold public offi ce) remain rights in pos-
session of individuals by reason of their citizenship, and, from the group of 
personal rights and freedoms, a right to diplomatic and consular protection 
abroad or even a right to return to the country of citizenship. The same is 
true of responsibilities. While being in a state’s territory requires each indi-
vidual to respect that state’s rights, including the payment of taxes, certain 
obligations are reserved exclusively or almost always to citizens. Citizen-
ship, therefore, implies, in particular, a defensive duty and duty of fi delity 
to the state. Extending these obligations to foreign permanent residents 
would jeopardise the host state’s interests and put such residents in a situa-
tion of infi delity towards the state of which they remain citizens.
The view of the far-reaching depreciation of the importance of citizen-
ship cannot, therefore, be accepted. Its still signifi cant role can be dem-
onstrated, on the one hand, by the fact that the right to citizenship is 
recognised as part of human rights63 and, on the other hand, by the tighten-
61  K. Trzciński, Zmierzch obywatelstwa patriarchalnego w nowożytnej Europie. Szkic 
do badań procesu, „Szkice Humanistyczne”, no. 1/2005, pp. 235–244.
62  Human Rights Law in Europe: The Infl uence, Overlaps and Contradictions of the 
EU and the ECHR, eds. K. Dzehtsiarou, T. Konstadinides, T. Lock, N. O’Meara, 
Abingdon 2014.
63  The Human Right to Citizenship: A Slippery Concept, eds. R.E. Howard-Hass-
mann, M. Walton-Roberts, Philadelphia 2015
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ing of immigration and naturalisation rules in some European countries. 
Citizenship remains the primary regulator of an individual’s legal position 
in the state and has a strong external demarcation dimension. Raymond 
Aron, once examining the possibility of establishing transnational citizen-
ship, concluded that human rights could be fragile when civil rights do not 
correspond to them.64 However, the weight of the international system for 
the protection of human rights cannot be overestimated, for it is largely 
about restraining the state from the temptation to violate an individual’s 
rights. Consequently, the human rights-to-civil rights relationship must 
be regarded as complementary rather than opposing or competitive. 
The current development of European citizenship can also serve as 
another example of citizenship’s external opening. Its institutionalization 
in the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 provided EU countries’ citizens with the 
right to move freely and reside in other EU countries. Moreover, it gives 
them, inter alia, some political rights in their place of residence: active 
and passive rights in elections for local assemblies and the European Par-
liament. The Union’s citizenship could even be regarded ex-hypothesi as 
a forward-looking displacement of state citizenship in the community.65 
One can make here a distant analogy to the medieval municipal citizen-
ship, which has fallen in confrontation with state citizenship while trans-
posing on its soil a number of its solutions and values.
Conclusion
For more than two thousand years, the idea and institution of citizen-
ship in Europe has come a long way in its development. Fundamental pat-
terns of citizenship were created in ancient Athens and Rome. Subsequent 
models – medieval, modern, and contemporary – created in the sphere of 
theoretical concepts or at the legal level have signifi cantly enriched or, at 
times, impoverished the original patterns. The meaning of citizenship has 
been redefi ned according to specifi c socio-economic and political condi-
tions. At different stages of evolution, citizenship has covered a narrow-
er or broader part of state societies. Nevertheless, the core of citizenship 
rights, outlined in ancient originals, remains mostly the same.
From the perspective of more than two thousand years of evolution of 
citizenship in Europe, the following can be considered as its most impor-
tant stages:
64  R. Aron, Is Multinational Citizenship Possible?, “Social Research”, vol. 41, 
no. 4/1974, pp. 638–655.
65  Cf. S. Ivic, EU Citizenship: Towards a Postmodern Conception of Citizenship?, 
Wilmington DE 2019.
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– making the possibility of having full citizenship dependent on the cri-
teria of origin, sex, and age (Athens); 
– recognition of political participation in community affairs as the es-
sence of citizenship (Athens);
– recognition of the importance of civic activity for the duration of the 
civic community (Athens);
– prioritising equality of citizens before the law (Rome); 
– recognition of the place of birth as the primary determinant of having 
citizenship (Rome); 
– admission of the freedmen to the civic status (Rome);
– establishment of municipal citizenship by the local community within 
the state (cities in the middle ages);
– establishment of forms of citizenship that did not require domicile 
(cities in the middle ages);
– reception of urban civil liberties by the “political nation” (Middle Ages 
and Renaissance);
– linking ethnocultural origin and territorial state-membership within 
the institution of state subjecthood (absolute monarchy);
– recognition of citizenship as a political-legal relationship (Bodin’s 
thought);
– broadening the sphere of autonomy of the individual (English legisla-
tion in the 17th century);
– making access to full citizenship dependent on the value of the proper-
ty held (cities in the middle ages; the thought of Locke, Montesquieu, 
Kant, Constant);
– empowerment of the individual in the state through the bestowal of 
personal rights and freedoms (Locke’s thought; legal acts of the French 
Revolution);
– constitutionalisation of personal rights and freedoms (legal acts of the 
French Revolution; 19th century);
– the spread of political rights (especially voting rights) of men (Rous-
seau thought; French Revolution; 19th century);
– the granting of full civil rights to women (Mill’s thought; 20th cen-
tury); 
– the twilight of the importance of property qualifi cation for civic status 
(19th and 20th centuries);
– development of social rights (20th century);
– transposition of civil rights into the dimension of human rights pro-
tected by international law (second half of the 20th century).66
66  K. Trzciński, Obywatelstwo w Europie…, op. cit., pp. 235–246.
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However, at the dawn of the 21st century, citizenship ceased, in prin-
ciple, to be associated only with members of the state, and began to refer 
to the depositaries of the rights of the union of states. Although European 
citizenship remains in a state of development, the very fact of its estab-
lishing represents an entirely new quality for the idea. The future will 
show how the transnational model of citizenship will evolve.
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